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1Abstract
How does the persistence of earnings change over the life cycle? Do workers at
dierent ages face the same variance of idiosyncratic shocks? This paper proposes a
novel specication for residual earnings that allows for an age prole in the persistence
and variance of labor income shocks. We show that the statistical model is identied
and estimate it using PSID data. We nd that shocks to earnings are only moderately
persistent (around 0:75) for young workers. Persistence rises with age up to unity
until midway in life. The variance of persistent shocks exhibits a U-shaped prole
over the life cycle (with a minimum of 0:01 and a maximum of 0:05). These results
suggest that the standard specication in the literature (with constant persistence and
variances) cannot capture the earnings dynamics of young workers. We also argue that
a calibrated job turnover model can account for these non-at proles. The key idea
is that workers sort into better jobs and settle down as they age; in turn, magnitudes
of wage growth rates decline, thereby decreasing variance of shocks. Furthermore
the decline in job mobility results in higher persistence. Finally, we investigate the
implications of age proles for consumption-savings behavior. The welfare cost of
idiosyncratic risk implied by the age-dependent income process is 34 percent lower
compared with its age-invariant counterpart. This dierence is mostly due to a higher
degree of consumption insurance for young workers, for whom persistence is moderate.
These results suggest that age proles of persistence and variances should be taken
into account when calibrating life-cycle models.
Keywords: Idiosyncratic income risk, Incomplete markets models, Earnings per-
sistence, Consumption insurance
JEL: C33, D31, D91, E21, J31
21 Introduction
Two important determinants of labor income risk are the persistence and variance of shocks.
How does the persistence of earnings change over the life cycle? Do workers at dierent
ages face the same variance of idiosyncratic shocks? Answers to these questions are central
to many economic decisions in the presence of incomplete nancial markets. Uninsured
idiosyncratic risk aects the dynamics of wealth accumulation, consumption inequality, and
the eectiveness of self-insurance through asset accumulation. Thus, income risk is an
important object of study for quantitative macroeconomics. Moreover, the age prole of
persistence can be informative about the economic mechanisms underlying earnings risk.
For these purposes, we propose and estimate a novel specication for idiosyncratic earnings
that allows for a life-cycle prole in the persistence and variance of earnings shocks.
We are motivated by the observation that changes in earnings occur for dierent reasons
over the life span. For young workers, mobility|because of a mismatch or demand shocks to
occupations|might play an important role (Kambourov and Manovskii (2008)). Midway
through a career, settling down into senior positions as well as bonuses, promotions, or
demotions may account for earnings dynamics. Older people are more likely to develop
health problems that reduce their productivity. These changes dier in nature, and more
specically, in persistence and magnitude. Thus, we suspect that variance and persistence
of shocks are constant throughout a lifetime.
In our analysis, we decompose residual earnings into an individual-specic xed eect, a
persistent component, and a transitory component. The novel feature of our specication is
that both the persistence parameter of the AR(1) component and the variance of innovations
3to transitory and persistent components are allowed to vary by age. This paper, to the best
of our knowledge, is the rst study that estimates a lifetime prole of earnings persistence
and variance together.1
We show that this specication is identied and estimate it using earnings data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Our results reveal that persistence increases
at early stages in the working life: starting from 0:70 it rises to unity. These dierences
are sizable: 70 percent of a shock received during the early years in the labor market dies
out over the next ve years, whereas if the shock is received at age 40, 85 percent of it
would still remain after ve years. However, we nd a U-shaped prole for the variance of
persistent shocks: A shock of one standard deviation implies a 26 percent change in annual
earnings for a 24-year old. The corresponding number for a 40-year old is only 12 percent.
As for the variance of transitory shocks, we nd a sizable increase early on but a at prole
for the remaining working life. These results suggest that the standard specication in the
literature (with constant persistence and variances) cannot capture the earnings dynamics
of young workers.
We then ask the question of whether these life-cycle proles are statistically signicant.
To tackle this question, we estimate life-cycle proles by partitioning the working life into
three stages. Here, we assume that persistence and variances are constant within a stage
but might dier from one to the other. We test whether the persistence and the variance of
1There are several other studies that take into account variation in persistence and variance of shocks.
Baker and Solon (2003) and Gottschalk and Mott (2011) allow for age-specic variances in transitory
shocks, and Sabelhaus and Song (2010) also let both the permanent and the transitory shocks vary with
age and cohort. Hause (1980) estimates a process that has an AR(1) component with time-specic persis-
tence and variance of shocks. Alvarez, Browning, and Ejrns (2010) investigate the heterogeneity in the
persistence of shocks across individuals. Feigenbaum and Li (2008) nd a U-shaped earnings uncertainty
prole over the life cycle.
4shocks dier signicantly across the three age intervals. We strongly reject the hypothesis
of a at prole for persistence and the variance of persistent shocks but not for variance of
transitory shocks.
The estimates of persistence in the literature are close to unity. The age-dependent
estimate of persistence lies substantially below one for most of the lifetime. We argue that
the high persistence in the literature is driven by targeting the linear, if not convex, increase
in residual earnings inequality over the working life. Namely, estimation avoids lower levels
of persistence, which would imply a concave rise in inequality. The age-dependent income
process matches the inequality prole without high levels of persistence; thanks to the
inverse relationship between persistence and the variance of labor income shocks that our
estimates reveal.
To explore one possible mechanism behind the rise in the increase in persistence and
decrease in the variance of persistent shocks early in life, we study the implications of
the job turnover model by Jovanovic (1979). In this model, unemployed workers match
with rms and draw a match-specic productivity, unobservable to both the rm and the
worker. Output is the sum of match productivity and a white noise. Firms pay workers their
expected productivity. After observing the output, both the worker and the rm update
their beliefs about the match productivity in a Bayesian fashion. In the end of the period,
workers decide whether to quit and meet another rm or stay on the same job based on
their beliefs.
In a simple calibration exercise, we show that the model is quite successful in generating
the age proles in the data, i.e., the increase in persistence and the decrease in variance of
5persistent shocks early in working life. The mechanism behind this result can be summarized
as follows: The model implies that wages of stayers follow a random walk, whereas the
autocorrelation of wages is very small for quitters. The overall persistence is a combination
of these two. As workers age, they sort into jobs with better match productivities and settle
down, which results in an increase in the number of stayers, thereby resulting in an increase
in persistence. Similarly, as match productivity is being revealed, the magnitude of changes
in beliefs and thus wages decrease and in turn the variance of persistent shocks declines.
This mechanism is known to have empirical relevance (Flinn (1986)). Therefore, we also
view these results as complementary to our econometric analysis, providing justication for
the age proles.
We then investigate the economic implications of the age-dependent income process. In
particular, we ask how much the presence of age proles matters for the insurability of
labor income shocks and the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk. For this purpose, we study
a standard life-cycle model featuring incomplete nancial markets and a social security
system. We compare the consumption-savings implications of the age-dependent income
process with its age-invariant counterpart.
We nd that, in an economy with natural borrowing constraints (NBC), the age-dependent
income process implies a much higher consumption insurance against persistent shocks:
Around 56 percent of persistent shocks translate into consumption growth under the age-
dependent income process compared to 38 percent for the age-invariant specication. Most
of this dierence comes from young workers for whom the degree of insurance is as high as
70 percent under the age-dependent process as opposed to 30 percent for the age-invariant
6specication. This dierence is due to the level of persistence, which is particularly low
for young workers under the age-dependent process. In the presence of highly persistent
shocks, agents refrain from borrowing against the possibility of a long sequence of low in-
come realizations. Insurance against such shocks is, therefore, mostly through assets. This
type of self-insurance is not possible for young agents, since they don't have enough wealth.
In an economy with zero borrowing constraints (ZBC), consumption insurance is lower
for both specications compared with the NBC economy. Now, the gap in consumption
insurance between the age-dependent and the age-invariant processes is smaller: 38 percent
for the age-dependent vs. 30 percent for the age-invariant. The decrease in the gap is due
to young workers who lack the borrowing option to insure against moderately persistent
shocks.
We also compare the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk implied by the age-dependent
process with the age-invariant one. We nd substantial dierences: In the NBC (ZBC)
economy, welfare costs of lifetime shocks is 3:13 percent (5:80 percent) under the age-
dependent income process, whereas this number is 4:76 percent (6:80 percent) for the age-
invariant specication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the statistical
model that we estimate, discuss its identication, and present our results. Section 3 presents
the structural job turnover model. Section 4 presents the life-cycle model that is used to
study the consumption-savings implications of the age-dependent process. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
72 Empirical Analysis
In this section we describe the statistical model for earnings, and discuss the data and our
benchmark sample. The empirical ndings are presented at the end of this section.
2.1 An Age-Dependent Income Process
Let yi
h;t denote the log of annual earnings of individual i of age h at time t. To obtain the
residual income ~ yi













The rst component in this specication, f, is a function of age and schooling and
captures the life-cycle component of earnings that is common to everyone. Xi
h;t is a vector
of observables that includes a cubic polynomial in age and education dummies for less than a
high school diploma, high school diploma, and a college degree. The parameter  is indexed
by t to allow the coecients on age and schooling to change over time and captures changes
in returns to age and schooling that took place over time.
Residual income is decomposed into a xed eect, an AR(1) component, and a transitory
component. This representation is parsimonious, yet it captures the salient features of the
data well. Therefore, it is widely used in the literature. This paper extends the standard
specication to allow for a lifetime prole in the persistence parameter, the variance of
persistent and transitory shocks:
8~ y
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Here, i is an individual-specic xed eect that captures the variation in initial con-
ditions such as innate ability. "i
h is a fully transitory component that encompasses both
measurement error and temporary changes in earnings such as bonuses and overtime pay.2
zi
h is the persistent component of idiosyncratic income at age h that captures lasting changes
in earnings such as promotions and health status. Each period the individual is hit by a
persistent shock of size i
h. The magnitude of this shock is governed by the variance 2
;h,
and the extent to which it lasts is determined by the persistence parameter . zi
1;t captures
the initial variation in the persistent component.3 The key innovation of our paper is to
allow for an age prole in the variance of shocks, 2
;h and 2
";h, as well as in the durability of
the persistent shocks, h. The age proles capture the idea that changes in earnings occur
for dierent reasons throughout the life span.
A number of studies document the evolution of residual inequality for the United States
in the last three decades (e.g., Gottschalk and Mott (2011); Heathcote, Perri, and Violante
(2010); and Panousi, Vidangos, Heim, and DeBacker (2011)). We follow Gottschalk and
Mott (1995) and control for the change in residual inequality over time with t and t,
2These changes are potentially correlated with future promotions. However, we follow the literature
and assume that these shocks are i.i.d. in nature (see Lillard and Willis (1978); Lillard and Weiss (1979);
MaCurdy (1982); Abowd and Card (1989); and Baker (1997)). A notable exception is Hryshko (2011).
3Our benchmark sample is composed of workers who are at least 24 years old. Therefore, it is reasonable
to think that they already have some labor market experience, in turn, they have accumulated some
persistent shocks by age 24.
9representing the time loading factors for transitory and permanent shocks, respectively.4
Having introduced the age-dependent income process, an immediate concern is iden-
tication. Can the variance-covariance structure of earnings data tell us how changes in
earnings dier in variance and persistence over age and time together? The identication
discussion allows us to connect the statistical model to the moments in the data and makes
the estimation procedure meaningful.5 The next proposition establishes that the income
process (2) is identied and provides a proof:
Proposition 1: Specication (2) is identied in levels up to the normalizations that
1 = 2, 1 = 1 = 1; H = H 1; and 2
;H = 2
;H 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The rich panel structure of the PSID helps us to distinguish life-cycle eects from time
eects: We observe individuals with a given age at dierent points in time, and thus at
a given year, we observe individuals of dierent ages. This feature allows us to separate
what is due to calendar time from a life-cycle phenomenon. For this particular reason, it is
important to have a large number of cohorts in order to accurately separate these eects.
This observation guides our sample selection process.
2.2 Sample Selection and Estimation Method
This section briey describes the data and the variable denitions used in the empirical
analysis. We use 30 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1968-
4A related approach would be to control for cohort eects. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2005)
provide some evidence that time eects are more pronounced than cohort eects. Thus, we choose to control
for time eects.
5Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010) also explain the identication of time loading factors for
a standard income process.
101997. We estimate our model using both annual earnings and the average hourly wage
of male heads of households.6 Here, we present the results for earnings data. Estimation
results for wage data are reported in Appendix B.2; the results are qualitatively the same.
In order to have a large number of cohorts, we include an individual in our benchmark
sample if he satises the following criteria for three, not necessarily consecutive, years:7 (i)
the individual has an average hourly wage between $2 and $400 in 1993 dollars, (ii) his
age is between 24 and 60, and (iii) he worked between 520 and 5,110 hours during the
calendar year. We also exclude people from the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO)
sub-sample in 1968. These criteria are fairly standard in the literature and leave us with
4,324 individuals and 56,156 observations.
We employ an equally weighted minimum distance estimator. We minimize the dis-
tance between the moments of the (T  T) and (H  H) empirical variance-covariance
structure of residual earnings and their theoretical counterparts implied by income process













, to which at least 150 individuals contribute. This leaves us

























over h. Due to small sample considerations explained in Al-
6Earnings in the PSID are composed of wages, bonuses, commissions, and the labor portion of self-
employment. Hourly wage is dened as earnings divided by annual hours.
7In one robustness check, we restrict our sample to people with three consecutive income spells. The
results are reported in Appendix B.6. In an additional check we require people to have at least 10 (not
necessarily consecutive) observations. The results for this sample are reported in Appendix B.7.
8If we require that there are at least 30 observations in a moment to be targeted in the estimation, we
end up with 60 more moments and this does not have any substantial eect on our results.
11tonji and Segal (1996), our minimum distance estimator employs the identity matrix as the
weighting matrix.
2.3 Estimation Results
In this section, we present our estimation results. The emphasis is on the existence of a
nontrivial lifetime prole.
We estimate the lifetime prole of shocks and persistence in two ways. First, we estimate
a nonparametric specication, that is, we don't impose any functional form on the lifetime
proles. Then, we assume the life-cycle proles follow a cubic function of age and estimate
its parameters. Figure 1 shows the results for persistence. The point estimates for the
nonparametric estimation are shown in dots along with the 95 percent bootstrap condence
interval in dashed lines and the point estimates are shown in Table 6 and 7. We employ
a block bootstrap with 150 repetitions.9 The results of the cubic specication are shown
in the solid blue line. The parameter estimates as well as bootstrap standard errors are
reported on the left panel of Table 1.
Figure 1 reveals an interesting fact: Early in life, shocks are moderately persistent.
Persistence starts around 0:70 for young individuals and increases with age up to unity by
around age 40. The dierences also appear to be economically large (although a quantitative
evaluation needs to await the consumption model in Section 4). For example, more than 70
percent of a change in a 24-year-old's earnings dies out in ve years. This number is only
around 15 percent for a 40-year-old individual.
9Increasing the number of repetitions does not change the standard errors.
12Figure 1: Persistence Prole



























Figure 2: Variance Prole of Persistent Shocks












































13The variance of persistent shocks, shown in Figure 2, follows a dierent pattern. It
exhibits a U-shaped prole over the lifetime. Early in life, shocks are larger compared with
those in the 40s. The variance starts around 0:06, decreases to around 0:01 by age 35, and
remains roughly at for 10 years. Shocks toward the end of the life cycle are larger, which
manifest in a variance of around 0:035. These dierences again appear to be economically
large; a one-standard-deviation persistent shock implies a 26 percent change in earnings
at age 24, whereas a one-standard-deviation shock implies only a 12 percent change for a
40-year old.
Figure 3: Variance Prole of Transitory Shocks











































Figure 3 plots the variance of transitory shocks. There is a sizable increase early on; it
increases from around 0:03 to 0:07 by age 35. The prole is at after age 35. Note that











 0:7003 0:2974  0:0978 0:0095 0:7596 0:2039  0:0535 0:0028
(0:0604) (0:1035) (0:0607) (0:0107) (0:0524) (0:1059) (0:0670) (0:0120)
2
 0:0607  0:0593 0:0215  0:0021 0:0518  0:0405 0:0105  0:0002
(0:0129) (0:0237) (0:0135) (0:0023) (0:0100) (0:0219) (0:0135) (0:0024)
2
 0:0410 0:0221  0:0069 0:0008 0:0564
(0:0177) (0:0385) (0:0233) (0:0040) (0:0049)
Note: The numbers in brackets are bootstrap standard errors. 's are the coecients of a cubic polynomial.
Specically, for x = ;2
;2
 : xh = x;0 + x;1  h=10 + x;2  (h=10)2 + x;3  (h=10)3
in our specication, transitory component soaks up the measurement error.10 As we will
discuss in Section 2.4, this non-at prole is not statistically signicant.
What features of the data give rise to the increase in persistence early in the life cycle?
For this, we refer to the identication argument presented in Appendix A, where we argue
that the ratio of two-period ahead covariance to one-period ahead covariance at age h + 1,
corrected for xed eects, (henceforth, 21
h ) yields a consistent estimate for the persistence
parameter.11 The need to correct for the xed eect arises because both of these covariance
terms contain the variance of the xed eects. In correcting for xed eects, we use our
baseline estimate (2
 = 0:075), which is in line with the estimates in the literature. Figure 4
10It has been widely documented that earnings in the PSID contain substantial measurement error. In
this paper, we assume that transitory changes also capture the measurement error. The true sizes of
transitory shocks is not distinguishable from the measurement error once we assume fully transitory errors.
In Appendix B.4, we model the transitory component as the sum of an MA(1) and an i.i.d. component.
The latter is assumed to be measurement error, and its estimate is taken from PSID validation studies.






















= h+1 for h = 1;:::;H   2.
15plots the empirical counterpart of 21
h in the solid line along with the estimated persistence
prole in dots. The age prole of 21 closely resembles the estimate of the persistence
prole: It increases from below 0:7 to above 0:9.12
In general, the age prole of 21
h depends on the level of xed eects. To check for
robustness, we plot 21
h for the case where there are no xed eects (2
 = 0), shown in
dashed lines in Figure 4. We see that the increase in persistence is robust to the variance
of xed eects, though the steepness depends on it. Note that the estimation of an upward
sloping persistence prole is a result of targeting a fairly complicated variance-covariance
structure. Figure 4 conrms this increase over the lifetime from a much simpler look at the
data.
Some of the changes in persistence and variance that we observe might be driven by
young individuals who move from part-time to full-time employment or by older individuals
who are heterogeneous in retirement age. To control for the eect of part-time workers, we
12The increase in this ratio is also consistent with an age-invariant income process as in Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004), which consists of a permanent component and an MA(1) transitory component: ~ yiht =
i + piht + eiht; where piht = pih 1t 1 + iht; eiht = iht + ih 1t 1 and the shocks iht and iht are
uncorrelated at all leads and lags. For this income process, the ratio equals:
cov(~ yh; ~ yh+2)   2
















is increasing over the life cycle, which is consistent with the
data presented in Figure 4.
On the one hand, under this specication, the ratio of three-period ahead covariance to two-period ahead
covariance, 32
h , is constant and equal to one:
32
h =
cov(~ yh; ~ yh+3)   2













 (see Appendix B.10) exhibits an increasing prole over the life cycle. This
favors the age-variant persistence prole over the age-invariant one.
16restrict our sample to only full-time workers in Appendix B.5. The conclusion for persistence
is similar: persistence is increasing. Though, the conclusion for the variance of persistent
shocks is somewhat dierent. It is still the case that variance of persistent shocks for
younger workers is signicantly larger than the variance of shocks for middle-aged workers.
However, the dierence between the middle age and old age is not signicant. This suggests
that some of the increase in the variance of persistent shocks for older workers is driven by
early/partial retirement.





, h = 23; ;50














Note: This gure plots the ratio of two-year ahead covariance to one-year ahead
covariance, 21, corrected for the variance of xed eects, along with the esti-
mated persistence prole. All three series are smoothed by a moving average
method with a three-year span.
To explore the dierences in age proles between workers with and without college
degrees, we estimate the age-dependent income process on a sample of workers with a college
degree and on a sample of workers without one. The results are reported in Appendix B.9
17in Tables 17 and 18. We nd that persistence for college workers is increasing over the
working life, as opposed to being hump shaped for the non-college sample. The variance
of persistent shocks is decreasing for college graduates and U-shaped for those without a
college degree.
2.4 Signicance Tests
We now turn to the question of statistical signicance, that is, we want to see whether the
non-at pattern is statistically signicant. For this purpose we consider a model in which
working life is divided into three stages (age intervals); young, middle, and old ages. This
model restricts the persistence and variances to be constant within an interval but allows
them to dier from one to the other. The age bins correspond to ages 24-33 (young), 34-52
(middle), and 53-60 (old).13 These intervals allows us to identify systematic dierences
across age intervals.
Point estimates are shown in the rst three columns of Table 2 along with bootstrap
standard errors in parenthesis. The results, once again, point to the same life cycle proles of
persistence and variance of shocks. We test whether the persistence prole exhibits a hump-
shaped pattern. Similarly we investigate if variance of persistent shocks follows a U-shape.
Finally we test whether the increase in transitory shocks is statistically signicant. Formally
the null hypotheses are: H0 : 1  2, H0 : 2  3 , H0 : 2
;1  2





;1, and H0 : 2
;2  2
;3. The results are summarized in the last two columns of
13In choosing these intervals, we are motivated by the results of the nonparametric estimates shown on
Figures 1-3. Most of the changes in parameters occur in the rst 10 and last 8 years of the working life.
As we argue in the next section, changes in the parameters are driven by job mobility of workers, which is
high in the rst 10 years. This also guides us in choosing the initial interval.
18Table 2.






[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
















 0:0558 0:0588 0:0675 0:35 0:79
(0:0063) (0:0066) (0:0109)
Notes: [24,33], [34,52], [53,60] are age intervals in which the persistence and variances
are assumed to be constant. Point estimates are shown in the rst three columns along
with bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. The last two columns report p-values
for bootstrap signicance tests.
We nd that the persistence for young workers is statistically smaller than that of middle-
aged workers. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the persistence in the last
age bin is dierent than that in the second. As for the variance of persistent shocks,
parameter of the second age interval is signicantly lower than that of the rst and third
(at 5 percent signicance level). However, the non-at prole in the variance of transitory
shocks is insignicant with p-values of 0:347 and 0:213:
Note that the standard errors of linear and higher-order terms in the cubic specica-
tion are large such that one might suspect non-at proles implied by this specication
are insignicant (see Table 1). However, unlike quadratic polynomials, cubic polynomials
19can generate hump-shaped (or U-shaped) proles for dierent combinations of signs of co-
ecients. Indeed, the correlation structure between parameters of the cubic polynomial is
such that for almost all bootstrap runs, the implied persistence prole is increasing and the
variance prole for persistent shocks is U-shaped. However, for the lifetime prole of the
transitory variance, a signicant number of bootstrap repetitions do not imply an increase
over the rst 10-15 years. In a previous version of this paper (Karahan and Ozkan (2009)),
we impose a quadratic polynomial on lifetime proles and nd that both the linear and
quadratic terms are signicant for persistence and for the variance of persistent shocks.
Overall these results suggest that persistence and variance of persistent shocks have
non-at proles over the life cycle but not the variance of transitory shocks. Thus, from
now on in our analysis, we assume that variance of transitory shocks is age-invariant and
use estimates of the cubic specication with a constant variance of transitory shocks. The
results are reported in the right panel of Table 1.
2.5 Comparison with the Literature
We now compare the age-dependent process with the age-invariant version of this specica-
tion, that is, a specication consisting of a xed eect, an AR(1) component, and an i.i.d.
transitory component, where the persistence and variance of shocks are age-invariant. The
age-invariant specication is widely used in quantitative models featuring income risk. In
order for these cases to be comparable, we estimate this model on the benchmark sample.
The estimates are shown in dashed lines on Figures 1-3 as well as in Table 3. Our estimate of
persistence, 0:98, is in line with the estimates in the literature, which range from 0:96 1:0.
20It is surprising to see that for most of the life cycle, persistence in the age-dependent pro-
cess is signicantly lower than the estimate of persistence for the benchmark case. As the
examples above have shown, these dierences can be economically signicant.






Point Estimates 0:0146 0:9802 0:0774 0:0113 0:0831
Standard Errors (0:0265) (0:0114) (0:0157) (0:0016) (0:0087)
Notes: Table reports estimates of the age-invariant process. 2
z1 is the initial variance
of the persistent component. Note that the estimate of 2
 is smaller than the estimates
in the literature (see Kaplan (2010)). This is because the specication also allows for
a nonzero initial condition in the persistent component.
In what follows, we will argue that targeting the lifetime prole of residual inequality
in the data results in an upward bias in persistence if one does not allow for age-specic
persistence and variance. For the age prole of residual inequality, we rst compute d var(~ yh;t)
for every year t and age h. An individual in year t contributes to d var(~ yh;t) if he is between
ages h 2 and h+2.14 We then regress these variances on a full set of age and year dummies
and report the age dummies. The resulting prole is shown in Figure 5. The rise in residual
inequality over the lifetime is almost linear, if not convex. The increase is particularly steep
after age 35.
For the age-invariant process, the corresponding theoretical variances are given by















z1 represents the initial variance of the persistent component. So long as  < 1,
14We do this in order not to have too few individuals in each (h;t)-cell (similar to Guvenen (2009)).
21residual inequality has a well-dened limit, say, var(~ y). It can easily be shown that var(~ yh)
will converge to var(~ y) from below in a concave fashion. The degree of concavity is more
pronounced the farther away  is from unity. In the case of a unit root, the variance prole
will be linear. The empirical variance prole on Figure 5 implies that the t would be poor
if  is too far away from 1. Targeting these moments puts an upward pressure on  and
drives it close to 1.
Figure 5: Lifetime Prole of Residual Inequality






























Note: This gure compares the lifetime prole of residual inequality im-
plied by the age-dependent, age-invariant specications, and its empirical
counterpart. For the age-dependent specication, we use the estimates of
the cubic specication with constant variance of transitory shocks. As for
the empirical counterpart, we control for time eects.
At this point, it is worth stressing that the age-dependent income process does not need
to contain a unit root or a highly persistent component to match the inequality prole.
On Figure 5 we also plot the inequality prole implied by the cubic specication of the
age-dependent process in the dash-dotted line. The model captures the increase in lifetime
22inequality even if persistence for young individuals is very low. This is by means of the
inverse relationship between persistence and the variance of labor income shocks: When
persistence goes up with age, the additional increase it induces in inequality is compensated
by a decrease in the variance and vice versa. In this manner, the model is able to replicate
the increase in the empirical variance prole with lower levels of persistence.
Guvenen (2009) estimates a process that allows growth rates of earnings to dier across
individuals. He nds support for signicant heterogeneity in income growth rates and shows
that introducing this type of heterogeneity results in a lower estimate of persistence. The
evidence he brings forward for growth rate heterogeneity is twofold: First, he points to the
convexity in the variance prole of earnings and argues that this feature of the data indicates
the presence of growth rate heterogeneity. Second, he exploits the shape of higher-order
covariances, which features an increase in higher lags. This, he argues, can be captured
through growth rate heterogeneity but not by highly persistent shocks. It is worthwhile to
note that the age-dependent income process can naturally capture these features of the data
without growth rate heterogeneity. In fact, the age prole of residual inequality implied by
the age-dependent process is convex for most of the life cycle.
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) also allow for age eects while modeling conditional vari-
ances of transitory and permanent shocks, which are found to be insignicant. Their point
estimates reveal a U-shape for the variance of permanent and transitory shocks. However,
these are found to be statistically insignicant. In Appendix B.8.1, we provide the estimates
of the age-dependent specication with constant persistence; i.e. we only let the variance
of transitory and permanent shocks vary by age. We nd that the transitory shocks are
23then U-shaped and that the variance of persistent shocks are increasing at the end of the
working life but are at for most of the life cycle.
A process containing a random walk component and an AR(1) component with age
dependence in the variance of innovations (Baker and Solon (2003); Gottschalk and Mott
(2011)) can generate most of the age dependence in the variance-covariance structure that
we use to identify the age prole of persistence and variance of shocks (see Figure 4). The
advantage of the age-dependent specication over this is that it is more suitable for use in
quantitative life cycle macro models, since it requires one less state variable.
2.6 The Fit for Income Growth Rates
The previous sections have illustrated how the age-dependent process does a better job
in tting the variance-covariance structure of log earnings. This is expected since the
estimation targeted the moments in levels with a larger number of parameters. How about
the t for the variance-covariance structure of income growth rates (dierences)? Is the t
for levels better at the expense of a worse t for income growth rates? It is well known in
the literature that the estimates of canonical income processes using levels are strikingly
dierent than the estimates using income growth rates, suggesting misspecication of the
model (Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri, and Violante (2010)). This section investigates this aspect
of the age-dependent process for the variance of income growth rates as well as one-lag
covariances.
The theoretical moments for the age-dependent process (abstracting from time eects)
are given by:
24var(yi;h) = (h 1   1)


















To compute the empirical counterparts, we compute these moments for all (h;t) cells
and regress them on age and year dummies. The dots in the left panel of Figure 6 plot the
resulting variance prole. This reveals a U-shaped prole. Theoretical moments implied
by the cubic specication, shown in the solid line, show that the age-dependent process
does a good job of capturing the U-shape. However, the same moments implied by the
age-invariant process, shown in the dashed line, cannot match this prole.
To assess how the age-dependent process ts the covariance prole of dierences at one
lag, we plot the empirical and theoretical counterparts of this prole on the right panel
of Figure 6. In the data, the covariance prole is almost at over the lifetime, which is
very similar to what is implied by the age-dependent specication. However, the empirical
covariance is closer to zero. As for the age-invariant process, covariance prole is also at
but much further away from zero compared with the age-dependent specication.
Overall, we conclude that the age-dependent income process achieves a better t for
the moments in levels without worsening the t for the moment structure in dierences.
If anything, it ts the empirical variance and one-lag covariance proles better than the
age-invariant specication.
25Figure 6: Variance Prole of Income Growth Rates
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3 An Economic Rationale for the Age-Dependent Spec-
ication
Through a series of econometric analyses, we have shown that the persistence and variance
of innovations to earnings exhibit non-trivial age proles. A natural follow-up question
would be which economic forces may give rise to these proles. In this section, we elaborate
on the economic rationale behind having an age-dependent income process.
To speculate about one mechanism, these proles could be due to dierences in insurance
opportunities against earnings shocks between young and old workers. For example, in case
of an adverse demand shock to an individual's occupation, one might switch to a dierent
one if she is young. For an old worker, though, switching is costlier (e.g., because of
26occupation-specic human capital). Therefore, shocks of the same nature can translate into
innovations with dierent persistence over the working life.
Note that the increase in persistence and decrease in variance of persistent shocks take
place in the rst 10 years of the working life, which coincides with the period where job
turnover of workers is high (see Topel and Ward (1992)). Thus, another mechanism, again
related to mobility, would be learning about the match quality, rst studied by Jovanovic
(1979). In his setup, neither the worker nor the rm know the productivity of the match
before employment. After observing the output, match productivity is revealed to both
parties in a Bayesian fashion. This generates endogenous movements in wages and job
turnover. Flinn (1986) presents evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY/66) in favor of this theory. We now study the wage dynamics implied by this model.
3.1 A Model of Job Mobility
Our economy consists of a continuum of workers endowed with one unit of time per period.
Workers maximize the present value of their lifetime earnings and discount future earnings
at a constant interest rate of r. They are subject to death with constant probability .
There are a continuum of rms that have access to a constant-returns-to-scale-production
technology. Labor is the only input to the production.
At the beginning of a period, unemployed workers meet with rms, form a match, and
draw a productivity specic to the match, , from a normal distribution with mean 
and variance 2
. The match-specic productivity is not known by the rm or the worker.
Employed workers with tenure, t, receive their compensation, wt, before production takes
27place. Output of the match, yt, is given by yt =  + t, where t is an i.i.d. normal
random variable with mean 0 and variance 2
. After observing the output, workers and
employers update their beliefs about the match productivity in a Bayesian fashion. Since
the information set of the worker and the rm are the same, their beliefs are identical. By
means of normality assumptions, this belief is normally distributed as well.
Let mtjt 1 denote the mean of the belief about  in period t conditional on all of the
information up to period t   1, and let 1=pt denote the variance, thereby pt denoting the
precision. Similarly, p = 1=2
 and p = 1=2
 denote the precision of the distribution of 
and t, respectively. Finally, !t  N(0;1=pt) represents the deviation of the belief from the








pt = p + (t   1)p; (3)
and yt = mtjt 1 + !t | {z }

+t:





. After updating the beliefs, a worker decides whether to
break the match. We assume that upon breaking the match, she immediately meets another
employer with a new match productivity.15
15The initial beliefs are given by the unconditional mean of the distribution for match productivity, thus
they are the same for every quitter (m1j0 = ).
283.2 A Quantitative Evaluation of the Model
In order to evaluate the performance of this model on earnings dynamics, we calibrate
the model, simulate it, and then estimate the age-dependent income process using residual
wages from simulated data. Our exercise shows that the model has the potential to replicate
our empirical ndings for non-at age proles.
3.2.1 Calibration
This is a fairly stylized model with only ve parameters: r; ; ; 2
; and 2
. The model
period is one year. The interest rate, r, is set to an annual rate of 3 percent. We set  to
1=37 to match an average working life of 37 years, motivated by our dataset. The model
allows the normalization of the mean of match productivity; we set  to a computationally
convenient value.
We calibrate the remaining two parameters; the variance of match productivity, 2
, and
the variance of the i.i.d. shock, 2
, by targeting two moments from our empirical ndings.
2
 has a pronounced eect on the level of the variance of persistent shocks. In the data,
changes in the variance of persistence shocks at older ages are due to reasons not captured
by this model (for example, health shocks). Thus, we target the average of the rst 10
years' variance of persistent shocks.
In the model, an increase in 2
 increases the time it takes for the match quality to be
revealed. This increase in turn increases the time to settle down into jobs, which can be
approximated by average persistence over the last 25 years.16 Our second target is therefore
16As we discuss in the next section, persistence increases as workers settle down into jobs.
29this average. At no point in the calibration do we target the prole of persistence and the
variance of shocks. Table 4 summarizes our calibration exercise.
Table 4: Calibrating Model Parameters
Parameter Value
r, interest rate 3%
, death probability 1=37
, mean of match productivity 10
2
, variance of match productivity 0:50
2
, variance of iid productivity shock 0:50
Empirical Moments Used in Calibration
Moment Data Model
Average variance of persistent shocks in rst 10 years 0:0495 0:0490
Average persistence prole in last 25 years 0:968 0:965
3.2.2 Simulation Results
We simulate 10,000 individuals, run the rst stage regressions to obtain the residuals, and
estimate the nonparametric specication of the age-dependent process. Figure 7 shows the
results.
The top panel shows that persistence prole is increasing with age. The mechanism
behind this increase can be summarized as follows. First, let's consider a worker who
stays in the same job. Her wage can be expressed as the sum of her previous wage and
a mean-zero innovation, implying a random walk. Namely, wt = mtjt 1. Equation (3)













pt+p (!t + t) = wt + t;
where t  N(0;
p
pt(pt+p)). On the other hand, job switchers always get the unconditional
mean of the match-specic component , implying a low correlation between current and
future wages. Therefore, persistence is lower for them. The persistence of income changes
30in the overall sample is a combination of the persistence of these two subsamples. Over
the lifetime, the fraction of switchers declines with age because workers settle into more
productive jobs as they age.17 Thus, they are less likely to switch to other jobs. This
implies a rising persistence prole. Furthermore, the bottom panel of Figure 7 shows a
decreasing variance prole for persistent shocks. This decrease is because both the number
of stayers increases and the variance of innovations to wages declines with tenure for stayers.
Namely, the variance of t is decreasing, since pt is increasing in t.
Figure 7: Simulation Results for the Learning Model



















































This section presented a theoretical background for our empirical ndings. We have
17This is consistent with the empirical ndings on worker turnover (see Topel and Ward (1992)).
31illustrated that a very stylized model of learning ( a la Jovanovic (1979)) implies an increasing
persistence prole and a decreasing variance over the working life. The mechanism discussed
here is known to have empirical relevance (see Flinn (1986)). Therefore, we also view these
results as complementary to our econometric analysis in Section 2, providing independent
evidence for the age proles.
4 Consumption-Savings Implications
There is a large literature that rejects full consumption insurance for the U.S. economy
(Cochrane (1991); Mace (1991); and Attanasio and Davis (1996)) making the nature of labor
income risk an important object for economic research. This paper so far has established
the existence of a non-at lifetime prole in persistence and variance of shocks. We now
investigate its consumption-savings implications. In particular, we are interested in the
insurability of labor income shocks and the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk under dierent
specications for earnings. To address these issues, we consider a standard life-cycle model
that features incomplete nancial markets and a social security system and compare the
implications of the age-dependent income process with the age-invariant process.
We now briey describe the model that we use to study this question. The economy














h denotes the consumption of agent i at age h: They engage in labor market activities
32for the rst R years of their life and retire afterward. After retirement, they live up to a
maximum age of H:
Financial markets are incomplete in that agents can only buy and sell a risk-free bond.
Letting r denote the risk-free interest rate and ai
h denote the asset level of individual i of













h is the labor earnings at age h: Agents face an age-dependent borrowing constraint,
 Ah. We study welfare costs in two economies: a natural borrowing constraint economy
(NBC) and a zero borrowing constraint economy (ZBC).18 It is important to investigate
these two cases for the question we have in mind, because the evaluation of the tradeo
between persistence and variance of shocks depends crucially on the extent of the borrowing
limit. Namely, if borrowing limits are loose, the not-so-persistent but large shocks to young
agents can be well insured by borrowing. On the other hand, in case of tight borrowing
limits, the magnitude of shocks matters more.
While in the labor market, agents' earnings is composed of both a deterministic part,
which is common to everyone, and an idiosyncratic component, which captures individu-
als' earnings risk. We consider two specications for the idiosyncratic component: i) the
age-dependent income process and ii) the age-invariant process as we discussed in Section
2.5. The rst is calibrated according to the cubic specication with constant variance of
18The natural borrowing limit is the maximum amount that an agent can pay back for sure out of future
earnings.
33transitory shocks reported in Table 1. The parameters of the latter come from the estimates
reported in Table 3. The deterministic component of earnings is estimated using the PSID
data.
There is a social security system that pays a pension after retirement. We model the
retirement salary as a function of the xed eect and the persistent component of income
in the last period, lnyi
h = (i;zi
R). This function is modeled as in Guvenen, Kuruscu, and
Ozkan (2009) and is set to mimic the properties of the US social security system.
One period in our model corresponds to a calendar year. Agents enter the economy at
age 24, retire at 60, and die with probability 1 at age 84. We assume CRRA preferences
and set the parameter of relative risk aversion to 2. We take the risk-free interest rate to be
3 percent. We pin down the discount factor  by targeting an aggregate wealth to income
ratio of 3. The Bellman equations of the model, and further detail of its calibration are
explained in Appendix C.
4.1 Consumption Insurance against Labor Income Shocks
We now turn to the dierences in consumption insurance induced by the age-dependent and
the age-invariant processes. For each specication, we calibrate the discounting factor, ,
to match an aggregate wealth to income ratio of 3. We compute the degree of consumption
insurance at age h as:








h is the persistent shock faced by worker i at age h. This measures the amount of
change in the persistent component that does not translate into consumption growth.
34Figure 8 plots h over the life cycle for both processes in the NBC and ZBC economies. It
is clear that persistent shocks from the age-dependent process are better insured throughout
the lifetime. In the NBC economy, on average, 56 percent of persistent shocks are insured
under the age-dependent process, whereas the corresponding number for the age-invariant
process is only 40 percent.
Strikingly, most of this dierence comes from younger adults. In the age-invariant pro-
cess, the prole of insurance tracks the prole of assets. This dierence is because persistence
is constant and high throughout the working life, and agents abstain from borrowing in re-
sponse to a highly persistent bad income shock. Therefore, insurance against such shocks
is mainly through assets, which young households have very little of. The increase in assets
over the lifetime allows them to fare better against highly persistent shocks, which results
in an increasing consumption insurance prole.
However, for the age-dependent income process, insurance for young households is much
larger, precisely because the AR(1) component is moderately persistent for them. Con-
sumption insurance rst decreases until middle age and then increases until the end of
working life. This U-shape happens because of the combination of two eects: i) house-
holds get richer and can better insure themselves against persistent shocks and ii) persistence
of shocks becomes larger, making them harder to insure. In the initial phase of the life cy-
cle (24-40) the latter dominates the former, and insurance decreases with age. Later on,
assets are large enough that they compensate the increase in persistence. Thus, insurance
increases with age.
Similar comments apply for the ZBC economy. Insurance decreases for both specica-
35tions once we impose no borrowing, but it is still larger under the age-dependent income
process, though by a smaller margin. The decrease in the gap is due to young households,
who can insure against moderately persistent shocks via borrowing in an NBC economy.
Figure 8: Insurance Against Persistent Shocks























































4.2 Welfare Costs of Earnings Risk
We now turn to welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk under the two processes. Recall that
the low levels of persistence under the age-dependent process is compensated by the larger
variance of shocks (Figures 1 and 2). On the one hand, lower persistence implies better
insurability. On the other hand, larger variance implies more instability. In order to eval-
uate this tradeo quantitatively, we compute the fraction of lifetime consumption that an
36individual would be willing to give up in order to live in an economy without earnings risk.19




Age-Dependent 15:22% 3:13% 0:56
Age-Invariant 14:73% 4:76% 0:38
ZBC Economy
Age-Dependent 18:20% 5:80% 0:38
Age-Invariant 16:8% 6:80% 0:30
Note: Column (1) shows the welfare cost of total idiosyncratic risk in-
cluding risk due to xed eects, initial variation in persistent component
(zi
1) as well as life-cycle shocks. Column (2) presents welfare costs of
life-cycle shocks, i.e., shocks accumulated after workers enter labor force.
Column (3) shows the insurance coecient against persistent shocks.
The upper panel of Table 5 shows the results for the NBC economy. Column (1) shows
the total welfare cost of idiosyncratic risk, that is, welfare costs of income risk for a person
who has not entered the labor force yet. The rst two rows correspond to the age-dependent
and age-invariant processes, respectively. The age-dependent income process delivers higher
welfare costs. This is due to the fact that the level of inequality in the beginning and at the
end of the life cycle is lower for the age-invariant specication (see Figure 5). At this point
it is not clear how much of these dierences is driven by shocks and how much is driven by
dierences in initial conditions. In column (2) we report the welfare costs of shocks over
19The formula for welfare costs, , is given by






where V is the expected lifetime utility in the economy for which welfare costs are calculated, VComplete
is the expected lifetime utility in the complete markets economy, and  is the coecient of relative risk
aversion in the CRRA utility function ( = 2).
37the life cycle for a person with the average xed eect (i = 0) and the average initial
persistent component (zi
1 = 0). The dierences are signicant in the NBC economy: An
agent in a world with age-invariant income process is willing to give up 4:76 percent of her
consumption every period in order to have perfect insurance. The same number is only 3:13
percent for an agent in the age-dependent world.20
The bottom panel of Table 5 presents the results for the ZBC economy.21 As expected,
welfare costs have increased compared with the NBC economy for both specications. Note
that the increase is larger for the age-dependent process, and thus, the dierence between
the two processes decreases. However, welfare costs are still lower for the age-dependent
process (5:8 percent vs. 6:8 percent). We conclude that the evaluation of welfare costs is
substantially dierent for the two processes; however, the margin depends on the amount
of borrowing allowed.
These results have implications for the Credit CARD Act of 2009. One of the provisions
of this act restricts individuals under the age of 21 from obtaining credit cards without
the consent of their parents. If shocks were completely permanent, then access to credit
would be less crucial since they would not use the option of borrowing. This paper presents
evidence that young agents face very large variances of income shocks that are moderately
persistent. As discussed above, the borrowing limit for young individuals have signicant
20There is a caveat in this analysis. The increase in inequality implied by age-dependent specication is
slightly higher than the age-invariant process. Moreover, inequality both at the beginning and at the end
of working life are higher for the age-dependent specication. These might bias the welfare costs for the
age-dependent process. In an earlier version of this paper (Karahan and Ozkan (2009)), we conducted two
experiments, where we changed the parameters of the age-invariant process to match the level and the rise
of inequality implied by the age-invariant process. The results are qualitatively similar.
21For the case with tight borrowing constraints, the complete markets economy in the welfare calculations
is the one with full insurance against income risk but with no borrowing against the increase in earnings.
38welfare consequences under such an income process. Thus using credit lines in this envi-
ronment can go a long way as an insurance mechanism, making access to credit crucial for
young individuals.
5 Conclusion
Most of the existing literature on income processes has assumed constant persistence and
variance of income shocks over the life cycle. As a result, macroeconomists have calibrated
life-cycle models using these at proles. In this paper, we have estimated a novel speci-
cation for labor income risk that allows the persistence and variance of shocks to change
over the lifetime. Our results reveal that persistence is only moderate for young workers
and increases up to unity by age 40. The variance of persistent shocks exhibits a U-shaped
prole. These results suggest that the standard specication in the quantitative macro
literature (with constant persistence and variances) cannot capture the earnings dynamics
of young workers. We have also argued that these non-at proles have signicant impli-
cations for consumption insurance. The welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk implied by the
age-dependent income process is signicantly lower compared with the age-invariant process.
This dierence has important implications for the evaluation of redistributive policies.
There is a large literature that has mostly focused on statistical representations of id-
iosyncratic income risk. However, there is less work connecting wage generating structural
models to these income processes.22 Using a structural model of worker turnover, this pa-
per argues that the high job mobility of young workers can explain the earnings dynamics
22Notable exceptions include Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006), and Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010).
39implied by the age-dependent process. As a future work, we plan to investigate whether
these non-at proles can help us tell dierent theories of wages apart.
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45APPENDICES
A Identication
Here, we provide the proof of identication for the age-dependent specication in (2). The




































Proposition: The process in (2) is identied up to the normalizations that 1 = 2, 1 =
1 = T = 1 and 2
;H = 2
;H 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: We start by assuming that we know the variance of the xed
eect, 2
, and show that we can identify all the remaining parameters. Then we come back
to argue that the unused moment conditions are enough to pin down 2
.
Note that since we assume that 2






























= h+1 for h = 1;:::;H  
2. This pins down the whole prole of h for h = 2;3;:::;H   1.23 Note also that by
normalization 1 = 2.





. Once we recover these, we can
use (7) to identify the loading factors and variances of persistent shocks, ftg
t=T
t=1 and




























for h = 1;:::;H   1; t =
1;:::;T  1. Please note that var(zi
H;t) for t = 1;::;T and var(zi
h;T) for h = 1;::;H are not
identied yet.
Note that all of the parameters recovered so far depend on 2
. It remains to be shown












































































































































































Now, we are ready to identify the loading factors and variances of persistent shocks.






along t identies t
for t = 2;:::;T   1. Consequently, tracing (7) along the age dimension identies 2
;h for
h = 2;:::;H   1. By assumption 2
;H = 2
;H 1 which gives us var(zi
H;1).
47Now, our goal is to recover T. First, we identify 2
;1 using equation 5 for h = 1 and
t = 1. Then again using equation 5 for h = 1, t = T, we can get var(zi
1;T). Equation 7 for
h = 1 and t = T pins down T. We now have recovered the entire t prole.
The unidentied parameters so far are the lifetime prole of transitory variances and
their respective loading factors over time. We will show that the information contained in
5 is sucient to identify both of these parameters, thanks to our identifying assumptions









;h for h = 1;:::;H
identifying 2
;h over the life cycle (except for h = H   1). Fixing h, tracking 5 over t, and
using the fact that we already identied all the parameters except the prole of loading
factors on transitory variances, it is easy to see that t can be recovered for t = 2;:::;T  1.
B Robustness Checks and Other Estimation Results
B.1 Parameter Estimates for the Nonparametric Specication of
the Age-Dependent Income Process
Here, we present the point estimates of the nonparametric specication as well as their


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































50B.2 Results with Wage Data
Table 8: Estimation and Test Results for Quadratic Specication (Wage Data)
x x;0 x;1 x;2 Test 1 Test 2

0.7862 0.0163 -0.0003 H0 : ;1  0 H0 : ;2  0
(0.0534) (0.0048) (0.0001) 0.0000 0.0000
2

0.0495 -0.0033 0.0001 H0 : 2
;1  0 H0 : 2
;2  0









* The numbers in brackets are bootstrap standard errors.
** The last three columns report the P-values for the corresponding test.
Table 9: Estimation and Test Results for Age Bins (Wage Data)
x;1 x;2 x;3 Test 1 Test 2

0.8774 0.9706 0.9558 H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
(0.0266) (0.0170) (0.0265) 0.0040 0.3480
2

0.0280 0.0133 0.0243 H0 : 2
;1  2
;2 H0 : 2
;2  2
;3









* The numbers in brackets are standard errors.
** The last three columns report the p-values of the corresponding tests.
51B.3 Transitory Component Modeled as MA(1)






[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
















 0:0639 0:0627 0:0715 0:59 0:22
(0:0072) (0:0065) (0:011)















;h). [24,33], [34,52], [53,60]
are age intervals in which the persistence and variances are assumed to be constant.
Point estimates are shown in the rst three columns along with bootstrap standard
errors in parenthesis. The last two columns report p-values for bootstrap signicance
tests.
52B.4 External Estimate of Measurement Error







[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
















 0:0491 0:0479 0:0563 0:59 0:30
(0:0066) (0:0061) (0:0112)
Notes:Estimated process: ~ yi
















measurement error with 2
 = 0:015 (see Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1994)).
[24,33], [34,52], [53,60] are age intervals in which the persistence and variances are
assumed to be constant. Point estimates are shown in the rst three columns along
with bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. The last two columns report p-values
for bootstrap signicance tests.
53B.5 Full-Time Sample






[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
















 0:0517 0:0547 0:0590 0:32 0:38
(0:0065) (0:0060) (0:0088)
Notes:Estimated process: ~ yi










;h). [24,33], [34,52], [53,60] are age intervals in
which the persistence and variances are assumed to be constant. Point estimates are
shown in the rst three columns along with bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
The last two columns report p-values for bootstrap signicance tests.
54B.6 Consecutive






[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
















 0:0553 0:0597 0:0675 0:37 0:36
(0:0070) (0:0065) (0:0097)
Notes:Estimated process: ~ yi










;h). [24,33], [34,52], [53,60] are age intervals in
which the persistence and variances are assumed to be constant. Point estimates are
shown in the rst three columns along with bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
The last two columns report p-values for bootstrap signicance tests.
55B.7 Sample with 10 Years of Observations






[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
















 0:0474 0:0574 0:0663 0:11 0:15
(0:0078) (0:0071) (0:01057)
Notes:Estimated process: ~ yi










;h). [24,33], [34,52], [53,60] are age intervals in
which the persistence and variances are assumed to be constant. Point estimates are
shown in the rst three columns along with bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
The last two columns report p-values for bootstrap signicance tests.
56B.8 Estimates of the Age-Dependent Process with some Age-
Invariant Parameters
B.8.1 Estimates of the Age-Dependent Process with Constant Persistence






[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
















 0:0842 0:0548 0:0688 0:00 0:06
(0:0091) (0:0062) (0:0105)
Notes:Estimated process: ~ yi










;h). [24,33], [34,52], [53,60] are age intervals in
which the persistence and variances are assumed to be constant. Point estimates are
shown in the rst three columns along with bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
The last two columns report p-values for bootstrap signicance tests.
57B.8.2 Estimates of the Age-Dependent Process with Constant Variance of
Shocks






[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
 0:916 0:950 0:980 0:007 0:033
(0:024) (0:014) (0:014)
2
 0:0104 0:0104 0:0104
(0:0018) (0:0018) (0:0018)
2
 0:0667 0:0667 0:0667
(0:0070) (0:0070) (0:070)
Notes:Estimated process: ~ yi










;h). [24,33], [34,52], [53,60] are age intervals in
which the persistence and variances are assumed to be constant. Point estimates are
shown in the rst three columns along with bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
The last two columns report p-values for bootstrap signicance tests.
B.9 Results for College and Non-College Samples
In this section, we investigate how the proles of persistence and variance of shocks look
like for households with a college degree and those without one. Tables XX and XX report
the results for these two samples.






[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
















 0:0512 0:0560 0:0689 0:39 0:21
(0:0064) (0:0066) (0:0108)
Notes:Estimated process: ~ yi










;h). [24,33], [34,52], [53,60] are age intervals in
which the persistence and variances are assumed to be constant. Point estimates are
shown in the rst three columns along with bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
The last two columns report p-values for bootstrap signicance tests.






[24;33] [34;52] [53;60] Test 1 p-value Test 2 p-value
H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
















 0:0626 0:0585 0:0701 0:72 0:20
(0:0063) (0:0063) (0:0109)
Notes:Estimated process: ~ yi










;h). [24,33], [34,52], [53,60] are age intervals in
which the persistence and variances are assumed to be constant. Point estimates are
shown in the rst three columns along with bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
The last two columns report p-values for bootstrap signicance tests.
60B.10 Identication of Persistence





, h = 22; ;50














Note: This gure plots the ratio of 3-year ahead covariance to
2-year ahead covariance, 32, corrected for the variance of xed
eects, along with the estimated persistence prole. All 3 series
are smoothed by a moving average method with a 3-year span.





h) denote the value function of an agent at age h  R, with asset holdings
ai
h, xed eect i, persistent component of labor income zi
h and transitory component of
income i



























































h+1     Ah+1
Upon retirement, the agent has a constant stream of income from social security and faces








































h+1     Ah+1
62C.2 Calibration
One period in our model corresponds to a calendar year. Agents enter the economy at
age 24, retire at 60 and are dead by age 84. We assume CRRA preferences and set the
parameter of relative risk aversion to 2.24 We take the risk-free interest rate to be 3%:
As suggested by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), among others, the crucial part
of our calibration is to pin down the discount factor : We set this parameter to match an
aggregate wealth to income ratio of 3. This is important, since the amount of wealth held
by individuals aects the insurability and welfare costs of labor income shocks. We dene
aggregate wealth as the sum of positive asset holdings. Aggregate income is the sum of
labor earnings (excluding retirement pension).
The deterministic component of earnings is estimated using the PSID data. It has
a hump-shaped prole where earnings grow by 60% during the rst 25 years and then
decrease by 18% until the end of the working life. For the residual component of earnings,
we consider two specications: the age-dependent and the AR(1) processes. The rst is
calibrated according to the quadratic specication reported in Table 1. The parameters of
the latter come from our estimates in Figures 1-3.
In a realistic model of the retirement system, a pension would be a function of lifetime
average earnings, but this would introduce one more continuous state variable to the problem
of the household. We refrain from doing so, since this would complicate the model without
adding any further insight for our purposes. In our model, the retirement pension is a
function of predicted average lifetime earnings. We rst regress average lifetime earnings on
24This is within the range of estimates in the literature (Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003)).
63last period's earnings net of the transitory component and use the coecients to predict an
individual's average lifetime earnings, denoted by ^ yLT(i;zi
R). Following Guvenen, Kuruscu,








where AE is the average earnings in the population. The rst term is the same for everyone
and captures the insurance aspect of the system. The second term is proportional to ^ yLT
and governs the private returns to lifetime earnings. We set a = 16:78%; and b = 35:46%:
We discretize all three components of earnings using 61, 11, and 11 grid points for
the persistent component, transitory component, and xed eect, respectively. The value
function and policy rules are solved using standard techniques on an exponentially spaced
grid for assets of size 100. The economy is simulated with 50;000 individuals.25
25The number of grids for the income process is sucient, since simulated earnings are very close to
theoretical earnings. We nd that increasing the grid for assets does not change Euler errors signicantly.
Also, increasing the number of people we simulate does not change the model statistics. We conclude that
the current precision is sucient.
64